





In this paper I look into the notion of market power in the history of economic thought. In particular 
I investigate: a) the kind of entry barriers the economists took into consideration; b) the role they attributed 
to the number of firms present in a market, and their consideration of potential competition. 
As it is well known, modern economic theory states that market power is “the ability of firms to 
influence the price of the product or products they sell” (Martin 1989: 16). According to the traditional 
structure-conduct-performance approach to industrial analysis, this ability depends on the number of firms in 
the market, that is to say on the dimension of firms with respect to the market demand. In this view, the 
number of firms depends, in turn, on exogenous barrier to entry, which can be natural (like the uniqueness 
or scarcity of some resources), institutional (like patents, property rights, State privileges, State licences), 
technological (in particular economies of scale) or based on the characteristics of the market (like preferences, 
the size of market demand and the price elasticity of demand). The absence of perfect knowledge is also a 
barrier to entry.  
The approach of the Chicago School to industrial economics denies the possibility of permanent 
barriers to entry. In its view market power is only temporary, because freedom of entry can always eliminate 
monopolies, unless the State blockades entry.  
In the view of the New Industrial Economics, barriers to entry are not only exogenous, but depend 
also on the strategic behaviour of established firms aiming to prevent potential competitors from entering. 
Moreover, according to this approach, if there are neither institutional entry barriers nor sunk costs, even a 
limited number of firms can allow prices to converge towards marginal costs: “Such a market is called 
contestable, and in it the force of potential competition alone is sufficient to produce the same performance as 
a competitive market” (Martin 1989: 68).  
Historians of economics have indeed studied the theory of non-competitive markets from two points 
of view. On the one hand, they have analysed the history of the profit maximization analytical models in a 
non-competitive setting, from Cournot (1838) to Chamberlin (1933). On the other, they have studied the 
history of antitrust policies (since the Sherman Act, 1890). But in both of these veins of research the historical 
reconstruction of the sources of market power has been neglected. In the former, the reason for their 
negligence lies in the lack of a proper explanation regarding the sources of market power by economists 
themselves: in the economists’ contributions, in fact, those sources were taken as a given. In the latter, i.e. in 
the debates on antitrust policies, the reason is that obstacles to competition were not explained on the basis 
of economic theory (Martin 1989: ch.3). 
To the best of my knowledge, the history of the theory of the sources of market power has not been 
written yet. In the handbooks of Microeconomics or Industrial Economics one can easily find the attribution 
to Cournot of the first analytical model of profit maximization in a non-competitive setting, but it’s hard to 
find the name of an economist, before Bain (1956), credited with the paternity of the notions of the entry 
barriers I have mentioned above. 
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The method of my research was that of investigating selected periods in the history of economic 
thought in order to find the origins of the notion of market power. I started by looking at the writings of the 
most important economists belonging to the Italian marginalist school (Antonio de Viti de Marco, Maffeo 
Pantaleoni, Vilfredo Pareto, Ugo Mazzola, and Enrico Barone). The main reason that prompted me to 
investigate the writings of these particular economists is that most of them were public economists. As such, 
I presumed that they must have been interested in the theoretical definition of barriers to entry, because they 
were interested in the public intervention aimed at correcting market failures deriving also from those 
barriers. Moreover it is well-known, as Schumpeter reminds us, that starting from 1890s, those economists 
took Italy into a leading position in the world1. Three of them (De Viti de Marco, Pantaleoni, and Mazzola) 
took over the editorship of the Giornale degli Economisti in 1890, and turned it into the Italian voice of the new 
economic science. It became the most important review in Italy, and one of the most distinguished in the 
world in the field of pure theory. Hence, there are good reasons to think that their ideas played an important 
role not only for Italian economic thought, but also worldwide.  
In this paper I analyse the writings of two of them: Antonio De Viti de Marco and Maffeo Pantaleoni. 
 
2. Market power for Antonio de Viti de Marco 
De Viti de Marco (1858-1943) is well-known internationally as an expert in public finance. Quite some 
time before Buchanan dealt with him in his famous essay on the Italian school of public finance (Buchanan 
1960), the various editions of his Principles had been translated into German, Spanish and English (Cardini 
1991: 588)2. Historians of economic thought look upon Antonio de Viti de Marco as one of the economists 
who, at the end of the 1880s, introduced marginalism into Italy (Barucci 1972). 
De Viti deals with the sources of monopoly power mainly in an article against the public running of the 
telephone industry (De Viti 1890). The article is written with the aim of demonstrating that the telephone 
industry is not a public service. For De Viti, public services are characterized by two features: a) they are 
monopolies; b) they satisfy a collective want. He claims that while to some extent the first feature was 
present in the telephone industry, there was not, and there was not going to be, a collective need for the 
telephone (it was 1890). Hence, in his opinion, there was no need for it to be nationalized, but only regulated 
by the State through licences, as we will see later.  
In this context De Viti gives many explanations of the causes of monopolies.  The first one is the 
following: 
 
“big private monopolies […] are the characteristic phenomenon of the present economic organization 
and the natural result of three causes: division of labour, competition and big enterprises. The action of 
combining these forces in various ways leads to the triumph on the market of the most powerful and best 
                                                 
1 “The most malevolent observer could not have denied that it [Italian economics] was second to none by 
1914” (Schumpeter 1954, ed. 1976: 855). 
2 For a discussion of De Viti’s popularity outside Italy see also Kayaalp (1998). 
